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Can Synchronization Explain 
Representational Content?
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Multivariate decoding provides an important tool for studying the representation
and transformation of mental contents in the human brain. Specifically, decoding
can be used to identify the neural correlates of contents of consciousness (NC-
CCs). Decoding of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) signals has so
far mostly revealed content-selectivity in sensory brain regions, but not in pre-
frontal cortex. The limitations of fMRI-decoding only permit cautious conclusions
because fMRI signals are only indirectly related to neural coding. However, the
role of prefrontal cortex in visual awareness is also questioned by other findings,
reviewed in  Schwiedrzik (this collection). Neural synchronization might offer an
alternative to solving the binding problem by providing a computational means of
integrating information encoded in distributed brain regions. However, it is un-
clear whether synchronization in itself serves as a coding dimension for visual
features. Furthermore, other alternatives to synchronization, especially the role of
spatial codes, need to be considered as potential solutions to the feature binding
problem.
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1 Introduction
Information-based approaches to brain function
have been very successful in recent years (Pou-
get et  al. 2000;  Haynes &  Rees 2006;
Kriegeskorte et  al. 2006).  Most  importantly,
they  allow to  study  how mental  contents  are
represented and transformed during information
processing in the brain. My target article in this
volume (Haynes this collection) emphasized the
importance  of  an  information-based  approach
for the study of human consciousness, especially
for  understanding  the  neural  mechanisms  of
visual awareness. Whereas many previous stud-
ies mainly aimed to establish which additional
processing  needs  to  occur  for  a  stimulus  to
reach  awareness,  a  second question  is  equally
important:  how and  where  the  brain  encodes
the specific contents of consciousness. Research
on  these  neural  correlates  of  the  contents  of
consciousness  (NCCCs;  Chalmers 2000;  Block
2007; Koch 2004) has been sparse. For identify-
ing  NCCCs,  simply  establishing  that  a  brain
area responds stronger under conscious than un-
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der unconscious processing is not sufficient, be-
cause this could merely reflect unspecific pro-
cesses such as attention or memory (Corbetta &
Shulman 2002;  Goldman-Rakic 1995).  Instead,
for identifying the neural code of contents sev-
eral  specific  questions  need  to  be  addressed:
Which brain regions encode sensory information
in a representational space that exactly matches
perception?  And  under  which  circumstances
does a crossing of the threshold to awareness in-
volve  changes  of  representations in  these  spe-
cialized coding spaces? 
2 The role of prefrontal cortex
One example of the importance of considering
content-based  processing  is  the  global  work-
space theory (Dehaene & Naccache 2001; Baars
2002).  In specific readings of  the theory, con-
sciousness involves a distribution of sensory in-
formation from sensory cortices to parietal and
prefrontal  cortex  (Haynes this collection).  In-
creased activity in frontoparietal regions under
conscious perception is seen as evidence for such
a “broadcasting” of sensory information (Baars
2002). However, without additional support by
information-based or representational analyses,
increased activity in frontoparietal regions with
increased awareness might simply reflect unspe-
cific processes, say as in detecting or reporting a
change  in  perception,  rather  than  coding  the
sensory  information  itself.  In  several  studies
with  functional  magnetic  resonance  imaging
(fMRI) we found no evidence for changes in pre-
frontal  representation  of  sensory  information
under increased levels of awareness (reviewed in
Haynes this collection). Thus, we found no evid-
ence that sensory information is re-represented
in prefrontal or parietal cortex. 
At this important point, the comment by
Schwiedrzik (this collection)  adds  further  im-
portant  details  on  the  potential  role  of  pre-
frontal cortex (PFC) in visual awareness (Crick
& Koch 1995; Dehaene & Naccache 2001). In a
first  line  of  arguments  Schwiedrzik  provides
more detail on a point briefly sketched in the
original article (Haynes this collection), whether
absence of decodable information in PFC might
reflect limitations of fMRI-based pattern classi-
fication. FMRI decoding will only be able to ac-
cess neural information that is encoded in spe-
cific  formats  and  topologies  (Chaimow et  al.
2011).  For  example,  if  neurons  with  different
tuning  properties  are  randomly  distributed
within a voxel, then the voxel will not be able
to pick up any information about these proper-
ties. Thus, a macroscopic clustering of cells with
similar tuning properties is required for fMRI-
decoding to pick up information. So information
could be present in prefrontal cortex, but in a
format that is not accessible to fMRI, not even
with  the  increased  sensitivity  of  multivariate
analyses.  This  might  explain  the  discrepancy
between  the  absence  of  information  in  many
fMRI  studies  and  differential  responsivity  to
stimulus features of cells in PFC in non-human
primates (Pasternak &  Greenlee 2005).  Please
note,  however,  that  most  of  the  evidence  for
sensory tuning in PFC is obtained under work-
ing  memory  paradigms,  which  also  includes
temporal  two-alternative  forced  choice  tasks
(Romo et al. 1999). Thus, it is unclear whether
this generalizes to “realtime” perceptual experi-
ence.
There are further  challenges in  accessing
neural information. Schwiedrzik (this collection)
brings  forward  an  important  point  already
raised previously (Duncan & Owen 2000): cod-
ing in prefrontal cortex might be dynamic and
thus the code might change across time. Such
dynamically  changing  coding  spaces  might
again not be detectable in classification analyses
that assume a constant population code across
the period analysed (Stokes et al. 2013). These
points raised by Schwiedrzik are fully valid: It is
highly important  to consider  these limitations
when interpreting the results of fMRI decoding
studies. To some degree these challenges might
be  alleviated  with  future  technical  develop-
ments. For example, columnar-level information
can  be  accessed  following  recent  advances  in
high-resolution fMRI (Yacoub et al. 2008). How-
ever, many limitations of fMRI will remain due
to its vascular origin that only samples neural
information indirectly. Please note that the lim-
itations  go  far  beyond  the  points  raised  by
Schwiedrzik (this collection). For example, fMRI
might not only miss information, but it might
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also tap into information that is not available at
the level of single neurons. Say, if an fMRI voxel
samples  a  homogenous  group  of  cells  with
highly  similar  tuning  properties,  the  voxel
might reflect a degree of averaging that is not
available at the level of single neurons. 
Please note, that the target article was not
restricted  to  decoding  approaches  in  fMRI
alone. Instead, the aim was to outline a more
general approach to studying the neural correl-
ates of the contents of consciousness. If suitable
recording techniques were available the informa-
tion could be assessed based on a whole family
of  potential  representational  signals,  including
especially  axonal  and  dendritic  population
activity. Please further note, that any recording
technique  has  its  blind  spots.  For  example
single-cell  electrophysiology  is  biased  towards
large cells (Bartels et al. 2008), or optical ima-
ging with voltage sensitive dyes is restricted to
the surface of the brain (Grinvald & Hildesheim
2004). Thus, only a combination of techniques
will  be  able  to  provide  a  full  picture  of  the
changes in neural coding with varying levels of
visual awareness. Importantly, in a second line
of  argumentation  Schwiedrzik (this collection)
provides additional support and plausibility to
the finding that the absence of information in
PFC is real. For example the effects of lesions in
PFC  on  visual  recognition  can  be  strikingly
weak, which would not be expected if represent-
ation or routing of information in PFC were a
necessary condition for awareness.
A  third  line  of  argumentation  brings
neural  integration  between  spatially  separated
brain regions into play as a different potential
mechanism of visual awareness (Engel & Singer
2001).  The  basic  idea  is  that  representation
might  involve  a  dynamic  binding  involving  a
synchronization of neural activity. According to
this model, as Schwiedrzik points out, a distri-
bution  of  sensory  information  into  prefrontal
brain  regions  might  not  be  necessary.  Many
studies have related changes in neural synchron-
ization to changes in visual awareness (see e.g.,
Engel & Singer 2001; Uhlhaas et al. 2009). How-
ever, it is important to look more closely at the
explanation that can be obtained by changes in
synchronization,  specifically  if  the  aim  is  to
provide an explanation of the neural correlates
of  contents  of  consciousness  (NCCCs).  Typic-
ally, synchronization is not viewed as a coding
dimension for contents, but as a code for bind-
ing and integration of features that are distrib-
uted  across  multiple  content-specific  regions
(von der Malsburg 1999). The example provided
in figure 1 of the comment by Schwiedrzik illus-
trates this nicely. A person views two superim-
posed clouds of moving dots,  one green cloud
moving left and a red cloud moving right. The
features are encoded in content-specific fashion
with  two  different  activation  patterns  in  the
color area coding the two colors and two differ-
ent activation patterns in the motion area cod-
ing the two motion directions. Synchronization
between  the  neural  representations  of  “green”
and  “left”  on  the  one  hand  and  “red”  and
“right” enables a separate binding of these two
distributed  features  and  also  allows  them  to
jointly be more effective in activating any down-
stream brain regions (König et al. 1996). Here,
the contents are represented as differential ac-
tivation  states  in  the  content-specific  regions
and their  binding is  achieved by synchroniza-
tion. In this example representation and binding
are separable problems based on separate com-
putational  mechanisms.  However,  Schwiedrzik
(this collection) also goes one step further by
suggesting that the large-scale connectivity pat-
terns  between  brain  regions  might  themselves
code  for  different  conscious  contents.  It  has
already been shown with fMRI that connectiv-
ity patterns between remote  brain regions  re-
flect changes in visual awareness (e.g.,  Haynes
et al. 2005;  Imamoglu et al. 2012). It has also
been shown that connectivity matrices obtained
with  fMRI  can  be  used  to  classify  cognitive
states  (Richiardi et  al. 2011;  Heinzle et  al.
2012). However, to date I am not aware of any
evidence  that  fine-grained  perceptual  contents
are  encoded  in  differential  patterns  of  brain
connectivity.  Furthermore,  synchronization
sometimes fails to explain perception (Thiele &
Stoner 2003) and there other solutions to the
binding  problem  besides  synchronization.  For
example,  high-level  content-selective  brain  re-
gions that achieve a certain degree of tolerance
to variations in spatial location, still have con-
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siderable information about the spatial location
of features (e.g.,  Cichy et al. 2011). Thus, the
spatial  maps  and  their  associated  differential
anatomical  (as  opposed  to  functional)  con-
nectivity patterns provide a plausible alternat-
ive hypothesis to synchronization (Treisman &
Gelade 1980).
3 Conclusions
Prefrontal  cortex  is  often  considered  vital  for
visual awareness (Crick & Koch 1995;  Dehaene
& Naccache 2001), however multivariate decod-
ing studies have revealed a marked absence of
sensory  information  in  prefrontal  cortex
(Haynes this collection). Neural synchronization
(Schwiedrzik this collection) might provide an
alternative account for feature binding and se-
lective  routing  of  information.  However,  it  is
currently  unclear  whether  any  form  of  func-
tional connectivity can itself code specific sens-
ory contents.
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